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 ___________ 
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 ___________ 
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v. 
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____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 2-03-cr-00244-002) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
 ____________________________________ 
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) and for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 17, 2014 
 Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 29, 2014) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Anthony Askew appeals from the District Court’s order denying both his motion 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and his motion for the return of property under Rule 41(g) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  We will deny a certificate of appealability 
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(“COA”) as to the first of these rulings but vacate the second and remand. 
 Askew was convicted of numerous federal charges arising from his participation 
in six armed bank robberies, and his sentence includes consecutive seven-year terms for 
“brandishing” a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A)(ii), as well as orders of restitution.  We affirmed.  See United States v. 
Askew, 203 F. App’x 414 (3d Cir. 2006).  Askew later challenged his convictions by 
filing a § 2255 motion and two others.  The District Court denied them, and we either 
denied a COA or summarily affirmed.  (C.A. Nos. 10-1540, 12-3094 & 13-3912.) 
 At issue here are two motions that Askew subsequently filed pro se on the same 
day.  The first is another § 2255 motion, this time arguing that the District Court found 
the element of “brandishing” without submitting that issue to the jury as now required by 
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).  The second is a motion for the return 
of 18 items of property that the Government allegedly seized while executing a search 
warrant for Askew’s residence on July 8, 2003.  The District Court denied both motions 
in a single order the day after Askew filed them, and Askew appeals. 
 With respect to Askew’s § 2255 motion, the District Court concluded that it raised 
“the same” challenges Askew raised in his previous filings and denied it for the same 
reasons.  Askew correctly argues that his Alleyne claim is not “the same” as any claim he 
previously asserted.  Askew formerly raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
and did not challenge the “brandishing” aspect of his sentence, let alone rely on the 2013 
decision in Alleyne.  This error was clearly harmless, however, and we will deny a COA 
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as to this aspect of the order for the reasons summarized in the margin.1 
 With respect to Askew’s other motion, however, we will vacate and remand.  A 
Rule 41(g) motion for the return of property is an independent civil action for equitable 
relief.  See United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999) (addressing 
former Rule 41(e)).  If a defendant files such a motion after the conclusion of criminal 
proceedings, the burden is on the Government to “demonstrate that it has a legitimate 
reason to retain the property.”  Id. at 377.  In addressing such motions, the District Court 
generally must undertake at least some inquiry into whether the Government retains 
possession of the property and why.  See id. at 377-78; see also United States v. 
Albinson, 356 F.3d 278, 281-82, 284 n.9 (3d Cir. 2004) (summarizing district courts’ 
obligations under Chambers and to pro se litigants).  We review the District Court’s 
resolution of such motions for abuse of discretion.  See Chambers, 192 F.3d at 376. 
 In this case, Askew asserts that the Government seized and never returned 18 
items of his property and that he received no notice that he could contest the 
Government’s retention of this property because the Government never instituted 
                                              
1 Although the District Court misconstrued Askew’s § 2255 motion, reasonable jurists 
would not debate whether it should have been granted.  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 
473, 484 (2000).  Askew’s § 2255 motion was second or successive because it challenged 
the same judgment as his previous § 2255 motion.  See United States v. Winkelman, — 
F.3d —, Nos. 03-4500 & 03-4753, 2014 WL 1228194, at *1 (3d Cir. Mar. 26, 2014).  
The District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion because we did not 
authorize it to do so, and the District Court was thus obligated to dismiss it or transfer it 
to this Court to be treated as an application under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b) and 2255(h).  See 
Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2002).  The motion also does not satisfy 
the standard for filing a second or successive § 2255 motion because, as we recently held, 
Alleyne has not been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court[.]”  Winkelman, 2014 WL 1228194, at *1 (quoting § 2244(b)(1)(A)). 
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forfeiture proceedings.  See United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 669, 674 n.10 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (noting similar claim).  It does indeed appear from Askew’s criminal docket 
that the Government may not have instituted forfeiture proceedings.  The District Court, 
however, denied Askew’s motion without any explanation, and without any response 
from the Government, the day after he filed it.   
 No basis for the denial of this motion is immediately apparent to us.  Askew 
appears primarily concerned with some $25,000 in currency that the Government seized 
from his residence and, although we do not decide the issue on this limited record, it may 
well be that those funds are proceeds of his bank robberies or otherwise properly subject 
to the District Court’s order of restitution.  See United States v. Craig, 694 F.3d 509, 512 
(3d Cir. 2012).  But Askew also requests the return of numerous other items, including 
electronic equipment, clothing, luggage, and what the search inventory identifies as a 
“child support notice.”  See McGlory, 202 F.3d at 674 n.10 (addressing motion for return 
of “household items” including a stereo system and camera).  Without any explanation or 
immediately apparent basis for the District Court’s exercise of discretion, we are 
constrained to vacate its denial of this motion and remand for further consideration.  On 
remand, the District Court may wish to direct the Government to file a response. 
 For these reasons, we will deny a COA as to that aspect of the District Court’s 
order denying Askew’s § 2255 motion but will vacate that aspect of the order denying his 
Rule 41(g) motion and remand for further proceedings. 
